# From Trade to Raid: Institutions and Anglo-Abenaki Relations in 17th Century Maine

Chandler S. Reilly, N. Smith (2024). Working paper.
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4900473

## Abstract

Prior to the outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675, English settlement in Maine was characterized by relatively peaceful coexistence between Native tribes and English settlers. The first permanent settlements in Maine developed during the late 1620s and lacked a formal state for many years. There was no overarching colonial government, and the influence of the English government was practically nonexistent. Despite the lack of formal governance institutions, English settlers established trade relations with the Natives and avoided prolonged conflict for nearly 50 years. Sporadic violence did occur; however, these disputes were quickly resolved through negotiation or the severing of ties. We argue that the conditions for peace were made possible because of the lack of a formal state. The decisions that would affect relations between the English and the Natives were made by individuals who bore the full costs of their actions, which made conflict extremely costly and risked losing out on trade opportunities. These conditions changed once the Massachusetts Bay Colony annexed Maine under the control of its colonial government. The colonial government undermined the conditions preserving peace in Maine, prolonging King Philip's War in Maine and contributing to other wars toward the end of the 17th century.

## 1 Introduction

Early seventeenth-century Maine initially lacked a formal colonial government. Some historians have characterized the early settlement of Maine as comprised of unmarried fishermen, merchants, and seamen who "did that which seemed right in his own eyes, and rapine, violence, and crime prevailed" (Sewall, 1859, p. 110). Despite the impression given by some historians, the historical evidence suggests that Maine was primarily settled by families and farmers who did achieve some semblance of order (Churchill, 1978). Prior to the more stable settlements, early English voyages to Maine were fraught with conflicts with the indigenous inhabitants. English voyagers captured Natives and brought them back to England, setting a tenuous tone for relations between the English and Natives going forward (Varney, 1873). However, from the time of stable settlements beginning in the late 1620s to the outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675, relations between the English and Natives in Maine were not only largely peaceful but involved extensive trade in both goods and land (Baker, 2004). Indeed, "[t]he formative period of European-Algonkian relations was mutually profitable, invigorating, and only sometimes destructive." (Morrison 1984, p. 27) The purpose of this paper is to understand how, given the seemingly anarchical conditions and early tensions between the two groups, peace was possible for the first half-century of settlement and why relations later devolved into conflict.

The analytical framework in this paper is motivated by the rational calculation of peace-conflict decisions from the perspective of English and Native decision-makers. Similar to the 'trade or raid' framework employed by Anderson and McChesney (1994) and later applied by Candela and Geloso (2021) and Wilhelm (2024), we consider how the institutional context of English settlers and Native groups affects the costs and benefits of peace. Absent the presence of a formal government where decision-making power over violent conflict is relatively concentrated, these groups will face the full cost of conflict as they cannot rely on an external military to put their lives on the line over disputes. Similarly, the benefits of trade accrue to individuals in each group when trade monopolies are seldom enforced and restrictions on trade are limited. Under these conditions, there are strong incentives for peace as both English and Natives prefer to avoid the costs of conflict and preserve the gains from trade.

We argue that during early settlement, when Maine did not have a stable colonial government, the conditions described above held and were responsible for the observed peace. Because the English in Maine could not rely on an external army nor even a large, organized militia; conflict with the Natives would result in the destruction of their settlements and potentially the loss of their lives. This was similarly the case for the Native tribes in the area which were loosely organized and not a part of a confederation of tribes as was the case for the neighboring Iroquois. Furthermore, prior to the permanent settlements, the English had established trading posts and made annual visits for fishing and trade with the Natives. Expectations of repeated future interactions changed the Natives' and English settlers decision-making calculus towards peace and increased the incentive to avoid conflict.

This is not to say that the English settlers and Natives spent 50 years in perfect harmony. Boulding's (1978) "unstable peace" describes the relations between Natives and English settlers. In unstable peace "peace is regarded as the norm and war is regarded as the breakdown of peace, which will be restored when the war is over" (Boulding, 1978, p. 12). Although there were no wars (i.e., prolonged violent conflicts) between Native groups and English settlers in Maine until King Philip's War, there were various violent conflicts.[^1] It is important to note, however, that when these attacks did occur, they were quickly resolved without devolving into prolonged warfare. The conditions for peace (high costs of conflict and high gains from trade) incentivized peaceful resolution, maintaining what we are describing as unstable peace. These conditions though, did not last.

[^1]: The lack of war in Maine stands in contrast to other colonies such as Massachusetts (the Pequot War) and Virginia (the Anglo-Powhatan Wars) (see, Cave 1996, 2011).

Starting in the 1650s, the Massachusetts colonial government began annexing Maine. The colonial government introduced and enforced trade regulations and became more involved in the military defense of Maine. The change in institutions in Maine altered the calculus of peace for the settlers in two ways. First, the trade regulations and prohibitions began to erode the gains from trade between the English and Natives. Second, military assistance lowered the costs of conflict for the English settlers in Maine. Both effects tipped the calculus in favor of conflict. Now shocks, such as those preceding King Philip's War, would not be worth a peaceful resolution. Starting with King Philip's War at the end of the 17th century, conflict between the English and Natives raged until the culmination of the American Revolution. The Massachusetts government's increasing presence in Maine and the English government's increasing involvement in colonial affairs largely contributed to the expansion of violent conflict and the erosion of peaceful trade between English settlers and Natives.

Our paper contributes to two literatures. First, we contribute to a growing literature on the economic history of Native and European settler relations in North America (Dippel, 2010, 2019; Carlos and Lewis, 2010; Carlos, 2018; Gregg and Wishart, 2012; Courchene, 2018; Wilhelm, 2024). Brown (1970) emphasizes the European's advantage in bargaining with which they took the land from the Natives. In contrast, Washburn (1971) draws out the European's belief that land claims were illegal unless the prior rights of the Indian were recognized (see also, Kickingbird and Ducheneaux, 1973; Jefferson, [1787]1955). Debo (1989) goes further and argues that the Europeans did not have true military superiority and so had to bargain and trade.

Seventeenth-century North America has been portrayed as rife with tension and violence despite significant trade (Bennet, 1955; Demsetz, 1967; Vaughan, [1965] 1995; Washburn, 1988; Carlos and Lewis, 2020). We rely on Anderson and McChesney's (1994) and Candela and Geloso's (2021) theoretical argument along with qualitative analysis of the interactions between the English and Abenaki in colonial Maine to assess the impact of trade and government on peace. Candela and Geloso (2021) similarly show that for the Acadians and Mi'kmaq in Atlantic Canada, collective decision making in the absence of a formal state created conditions that allowed for peace between the two groups and relatively high economic prosperity achieved through extensive trade. The focus in this paper on English settlers and Natives in Maine provides additional evidence that stateless societies during the colonial period were able to interact peacefully. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that changes in governance (such as a formal state gaining more control) had tangible effects on the calculus both settlers and Natives faced in conflict decisions that contributed to prolonged warfare.

The second contribution is to the literature on the economics of conflict and peace (Fearon, 1995; Weede, 1996, 2005; Gartzke, 2007; Jackson and Massimo, 2007; McDonald, 2009; Mousseau, 2009, 2010; Coyne, Hall, and Smith, *forthcoming*). Weede (1996, 2005) makes the link between capitalism (free markets) and peace explicit; he argues that free markets cause both development and peace. Michael Mousseau (2000) develops a theory of peace arising between nations that share capitalist institutions (market intensive economies). Other work has focused on the link between financial openness and peace (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001), and the correlation between small government size and peace (McDonald, 2009). While this work is focused primarily on modern economies, we present a case study of colonial Maine that demonstrates trade between peoples is an important factor in the preservation of peace even when there are not shared democratic norms, developed economies, or financial markets.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our analytical framework. Here we describe the factors which influence the surplus of peace and the decision to enter violent conflict for both English settlers and Natives. Section 3 describes the institutional context for Natives and English settlers around Maine during the relevant period. Section 4 analyzes relations between English settlers and Natives in Maine before and after the annexation of Maine by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The final section provides concluding remarks.

## 2. Analytical framework of relations between English settlers and Natives

War, argues Fearon (1995), is a puzzle that scholars have tried to solve with three argument types. First, people (a state's leaders in particular) are irrational and ignore the costs of war or misunderstand the outcomes of their actions. The second argument assumes that leaders act out of self-interest and since they do not pay the costs of the war, they focus only on the benefits they and their cadre receive. The third type argues that rational actors fail to reach a peaceful resolution to conflict due to private information, incentives to misrepresent private information, commitment problems, and indivisible issues (e.g., land, religion, nationalism, or one's successor). Similarly, Jackson and Massimo (2007) explore the political bias that arises from a leader facing a different incentive structure than the populace and leads to violent action as a result. This also aligns with the first of Blattman's (2023) war logics, unchecked interests. Blattman argues that when the incentives facing leaders and their people are different, a leader's unchecked interests can be a cause of war. We build an analytical framework to explore the impact of institutional structures on this type of breakdown in peaceful relations.

Our analytical framework extends Candela and Geloso (2021) and considers the calculus of conflict and peace from the perspective of English settlers and natives in Maine. We assume the choice of violent or peaceful conflict resolution depends on the size of the surplus expected from peace which depends on four determinants: 1) The costs of violence (war); 2) gains from trade in the previous period; 3) gains from violence (war); and 4) the costs of maintaining peace. Further, we also consider how the costs and benefits of either peace or war are distributed amongst the natives and English settlers. Because we are outlining a framework intended to apply to multiple institutional contexts, we treat each group as an individual decision-maker as described below. This abstraction from individual choice within groups overlooks some complications of collective action within groups. However, our intention is to highlight how decision making is influenced under different sets of institutions once we apply this framework later in the paper. For now, we detail the costs and benefits relevant to our analysis.

The surplus from peace is given by the difference between the sum of the costs of violence and the gains from trade in the previous period and the sum of the gains from violence and the costs of maintaining peace. When both groups expect a positive surplus from peace, peace is obtained. Three other situations are possible, shown in Table 1 below. The English may expect a positive surplus from peace while the natives expect a negative surplus. Under these conditions, the natives will choose to engage in violence. However, the English still have incentives to maintain peace. A case where the English instead expect a negative surplus and the natives a positive produces the opposite results. In either case, we expect war is not inevitable as one group maintains incentives to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. War is only inevitable when both groups expect a negative surplus from peace. In this situation, both parties find it in their interest to engage in violent conflict.

**Table 1: The Surplus of Peace and Likelihood of War**

| | *Natives*: Peace Surplus > 0 | *Natives*: Peace Surplus < 0 |
|---|---|---|
| **English Settlers: Peace Surplus > 0** | Peaceful Interaction | English settlers try to maintain peace. Natives are willing to engage in violence. |
| **English Settlers: Peace Surplus < 0** | English settlers are willing to engage in violence. Natives try to maintain peace. | Both English settlers and Native are willing to engage in violence. |

In our simple framework, the surplus from peace is increasing in the costs of violence. As the amount of property, lives, and land at stake increases so do the gains from peace and the costs of violent conflict resolution. This creates incentives for peaceful conflict resolution. The costs are also dependent on each group's relative strength and institutional context.

The surplus from peace is increasing in the previous period's gains from trade. The establishment of trade networks and the knowledge of what can be gained for each group reduces uncertainty regarding the gains from peaceful interaction, informing present decisions. Gains from trade can be affected by institutions as well. Colonial governments, for example, may enforce trade monopolies (e.g., fishing, timber). If this occurs, gains from trade will be eroded and monopoly holders will have incentives to protect their monopoly right, both of which would reduce the surplus from peace. In Maine towns, where governance was highly localized, decision-makers were unlikely to enact strict trade regulations as this could only lead to significant decreases in the gains from trade they enjoy. Even when members of the centralized government are settlers who stand to gain from trade, the costs of trade restrictions have a much broader impact than those incurred by the subset of settlers making decisions about trade regulation.

In contrast, the surplus from peace is decreasing in the potential gains from violent conflict. Gains from violence can take the form of physical resources such as land but also political power. Political power is not necessarily independent from control over land. The point of distinguishing it here is to highlight that political power can also capture aspects of relations such as which group sets the rules governing relations. Successful violent conflict can shift the balance of power such that the English or the natives are on a stronger footing to enforce terms of trade and other aspects of relations into the future. A stronger, more centralized government will have decision-makers who have more to gain along these specific margins. However, even settlers in a local government setting have a chance to gain from acquiring more land through violence. Gains from violent conflict may also be indirectly affected through laws and regulations. For instance, there may be laws and regulations that reduce the possibility of acquiring land peacefully. Such a law or regulation increases the marginal value of acquiring the land through violence and increases the chance of violent conflict resolution.

Lastly, the surplus from peace is decreasing in the costs of maintaining peace. Peace maintenance involves making concessions to the other side or investing in defenses that will level the military playing field. While above we argued that time expands the expected profits from trade, time will also increase complexity. As more English settled and tried to capture the gains from trade, land for settling became increasingly scarce. As more natives sought gains from the beaver trade, hunting lands became scarcer. The competition for land and beaver and the influx of settlers increased the cost of maintaining peace as the situation became more complex. The increasing complexity also increased uncertainty over future conflict that may have increased the cost of maintaining peace as either side was unsure of what the future held and may have increased miscalculations.

The institutional context affects the distribution of the surplus of peace. More precisely, the *share* of the costs of violence incurred by the average person depends on governance institutions (Candela and Geloso, 2021). Under governance institutions where decisions to engage in conflict are made through a consensus within the group, the share of the costs of conflict incurred by decision makers is high. What we are describing as "consensus within the group" is distinct from governance through formal democracy. Absent any formal government, groups of people must instead come up with ways to facilitate social cooperation through self-governance (Leeson, 2014). However, institutional change that increases political leaders' decision-making power, concentrates the benefits on the leaders, and disperses the costs onto other group members would increase the likelihood of violent conflict resolution.

## 3. Institutional context

During the early years of settlement in Maine, English settlers and natives were on relatively equal footing in terms of military strength (Burrage, 1914; Reid, 1981; Leach, 1988). The natives enjoyed the advantage along some margins. The English population was in the hundreds with people scattered across numerous towns around Maine and early on were outnumbered by natives (Reid, 1981). The natives had tacit knowledge of the wilderness and, through trade with the English and French, had some access to firearms giving them a strategic advantage (Leach, 1988, p. 130). These conditions changed over time. For example, by 1676, the English had the population advantage over the Natives (Burrage, 1914, p. 216).

The English and Natives also shared a similar institutional context during the early settlement period. Namely, one of self-governance or "statelessness." Native tribes in and around Maine at the time were small, loosely connected groups. These tribes included those from the Abenaki, Almouchiquois, Etchemin, and Mi'kmaq peoples (Morrison, 1995; Baker, 2004). English settlers in Maine resided in towns along the coast with small-scale informal governments (Maine Historical Society, 1928; Churchill, 1978; Chandler, 2017). These arrangements stand in contrast to the relatively more centralized and formal colonial government of Massachusetts that governed a large area and had control over military decisions and legislation for the entire population in the colony. Governance in Maine was highly localized with substantial overlap between the identities of political decision makers and the average settler (Chandler, 2017). The government of Massachusetts similarly was made up of settlers of course, but the scope of the colonial government in Massachusetts extended much further than was the case in Maine. For instance, the Massachusetts Bay Colonial government had extensive legislative and adjudicative powers including those to regulate prices in specific markets which could affect the entire colony (Nelson, 2005). Self-governance in Maine meant that settlers and Natives incurred nearly all the cost of conflict if it were to be engaged in. It was their land and lives on the line.

### 3.1 Abenaki institutions in Maine

The Native peoples of Maine were broadly Algonkian, small, and loosely connected linguistically with Natives throughout Eastern North America (see Baily, 1969, pp. 2-3 for the origin of Algonkin). Unlike the Iroquois to their west which represented a much stronger confederation of tribes with more formal political ties, these groups acted more independently; the basic political unit was the familial band (Richter, 1992). Each familial band was led by a *sagamore* whose position was determined by birth but whose power was determined by earning public recognition through personal ability (Morrison, 1991).

At times the Algonkian tribes of the present-day Northeastern United States allied for war. This larger amalgamation of familial bands has been referred to as the "Wabenaki", but more correctly the Abenaki (Baily, 1969). Snow (1980, pp. 31-38) estimated the early seventeenth-century Native population of Maine between the Saco and Penobscot rivers to be nearly 12,000. At this time there were four larger groups of Natives occupying Maine: the Mi'kmaq, the Etchemin, the Almouchiquois, and the Abenaki (Morrison, 1995; Baker, 1986, p. 3-4). The Etchemin and the Almouchiquois suffered greatly from the plagues of the 1610s and were subsumed by the Abenaki before the English established Plymouth Colony in 1620 (Baker, 1986, p. 57).

The Eastern Abenaki were not primarily a political organization. Their relationships were defined by kinship and social affiliation rather than political ties (Baker, 1986, p. 195; Bennet, 1955, p. 195). Society's structure was not founded on military alliance; regionally, trade relationships built significant connections. Society's institutions were built at the level of the familial band and centered around Maine's tributary basins (Morrison, 1980). Thus, individual bands are often referred to by the name of the river on which they lived (e.g., Saco, Kennebec, Penobscot, etc.).

The familial bands were still migratory in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, especially in the north. In the winter they hunted inland, and in the summer, they fished the coastal region (Morrison, 1980). According to Morrison (1980), the migratory pattern and lack of reliance on agriculture led to minimal government and kin-based political leadership. In the south of Maine, the Almouchiquois, were more sedentary and practiced agriculture in relatively large settlements (Reid 1981, p. 3; Baker 2004, p. 79).

Despite these differences in migratory and sedentary lifestyles, governance appears to have been quite similar across Native groups. There were at times alliances made between familial bands, but governance primarily occurred at the level of familial band under the leadership of a sagamore (Morrison 1980, 1991, 1995). Morrison (1991) notes that while sagamores inherited their positions of leadership they "then needed to earn public recognition for manifesting superior personal ability" (p. 227). This sort of governance by consensus was necessary because the sagamore "had no sovereign political or economic authority in the usual sense of the term" (Morrison, 1991, p. 227). The features of Native governance in the 17th century are then well-described as 'stateless.' A sagamore could not act as an autocrat to declare war and conscript men in his fight.

Sagamores did have authority during active war but the decision to go to war was not a power held by any single sagamore. Morrison (1991) argues that "[n]o sagamore could have any more decision-making power over constituents than was granted through reciprocity between leader and led" (p. 241). Under these conditions, we should expect that the calculus to engage in violent conflict accounts for something close to the full costs of that conflict. This need not imply that violence was off the table in all situations. But it does highlight the fact that the benefits of conflict would need to be sufficiently high for individuals within the familial band (and possibly across familial bands) to choose violence over peaceful resolution. Or, alternatively, that the costs of conflict were relatively low.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the migratory patterns of the Kennebec and Penobscot bands eventually ceased (Bailey, 1969, p.109). The primary reason for this change was trade with Europeans. First and foremost, the fur trade gave them regular access to corn grown in the southwestern region of the Saco River. For example, in 1625 William Bradford gave an account of shipping a "boat load" of corn to the Kennebec in exchange for 700 pounds of beaver and some other furs (Davis, 1908, p. 208). Second, access to iron implements displaced their reliance on stone, bone, wood, bark, and antlers, accelerating all production processes (Bailey, 1969, pp. 10-12). This freed up more labor for the hunt, leading to a reorganization of labor, specialization, and formalization of family hunting territories (Morrison, 1984, p. 28). The access to European weaponry improved their hunting ability. This was not just adding guns, but using iron and copper to make arrowheads, knives, and other key hunting implements. Specialization in the fur trade allowed for the establishment of permanent residence inland on hunting grounds. The people of the Penobscot basin continued coastal hunting and gathering, but along the southern coast of Maine, the Natives moved inland leaving the coastal region free for the English to settle (Sturtevant, 1978, pp.142-3).

The Abenaki did not however first get guns from the English. Indeed, the Natives of Maine procured weapons from Western tribes who were middlemen for the French and Dutch (Bailey, 1969, p. 236; Bourque and Whitehead, 1985). Eventually, the English began to trade guns, but this was viewed as a poor practice by the English even before it was outlawed. As Bradford explains, "...and in time our English fisher-men, led with the like covetoussnes , followed their [the French] example for their own gaine; but upon complainte against them, it pleased the kings majestie to prohibite the same by a stricte proclamation, commanding that no sorte of armes, or munition, should by any of his subjects be traded with them [Natives]." (Davis, 1908, p. 236, original spelling maintained) Though this refers to the November 24, 1630, proclamation, there was no strict enforcement until King Philip's War, 45 years later (Davis, 1908, p.236).

Before King Philip's War, there was minimal legal authority in Maine due to political and geographic isolation, and thus settler-Native relations were narrowly commercial (Morrison, 1980). The Abenaki controlled the northeastern frontier and "Abenaki-English diplomacy assumed Indian equality." (Morrison, 1980, p. 371) Members of the two nations had legal standing in each other's courts. That is, Englishmen could appeal to the Abenaki sachems and the Abenaki could sue in English courts but "the option was rarely used" (Morrison, 1980, p. 371). However, the Abenaki viewed themselves as the political equals to the Plymouth Colony and the Massachusetts Bay Colony (Morrison, 1980, p. 365).

When the English first attempted to establish a Maine colony (1607-15) the Abenaki were allied in warfare against the Mi'kmaq (Baker, 1986, p. 65). Moreover, at this time one of the historically most highly respected Sagamores, Bashabes, brought unity to the war effort (Baker, 1986, p. 58). To conclude from this unified war effort that the Abenaki were politically centralized would be a mistake. Bashabes was not primarily a military and political leader. He was the leader of a trade network that extended from the Penobscot to the Saco River (Baker, 1986, p. 58). He was not an all-powerful chief but ruled by a consensus that was built on custom, kindred, or allegiance (Baker, 1986, p. 57).

### 3.2 English institutions in Maine

Prior to the annexation of Maine by the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Maine was a group of 'stateless' settlements. Several attempts had been made to establish a colonial government in Maine, much like the one in Massachusetts but political instability persisted for decades (Abbott and Elwell, 1892; Burrage, 1914; Churchill, 1978; Reid, 1981). At times, settlers in Maine tried to request political and military intervention from Massachusetts to address this instability (Reid, 1981, pp. 92-93). However, Massachusetts "took a disdainful view of the small and occasionally turbulent settlements of Maine and tried as far as possible to avoid any involvement in the affairs of the northeastern province" (Reid, 1981, p. 93). Massachusetts's avoidance of intervention in Maine amounted to refusing requests for military aid (Reid, 1981, p. 93). As a result, the settlers of Maine were left to govern themselves the best they could.

The lack of political stability in Maine led many early historians to characterize the region as being "unruly, rife with drunkenness, and general lawlessness" (Churchill, 1978, p. 21). However, this characterization overlooks the decentralized governance throughout Maine before its annexation by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The most consistent mechanism of governance throughout the early settlement of Maine was the periodic meetings of courts throughout towns in the region (Maine Historical Society, 1928; Chandler, 2017). Although courts in Maine were a consistent form of governance, "the colony's political identity shifted constantly during these decades [1640s-1680s], the names of the justices presiding over these courts was rapidly becoming a constant, familiar refrain" (Chandler, 2017, p. 100). These courts commonly heard cases regarding civil and criminal matters such as disputes over debt, sexual misconduct, slander, drunkenness, and violating the Sabbath (see, Maine Historical Society, 1928; Chandler, 2017).

Colonial courts, were of course, not unique to Maine. The Massachusetts Bay Colony also held courts to handle disputes and issue orders. The difference is that the other colonies in New England, like the Massachusetts Bay Colony, had governments that held and exercised significantly more power including, "the power to convey land to prospective colonizers, a monopoly of trade and the fishery, and customs concessions on goods going to and come from New England" (Reid, 1981, pp. 22-3). These powers would apply across the colony in which they were exercised whereas in Maine orders and decisions of the court appear to have only been enforced within specific towns. That is, governance in Maine was distinctly more decentralized than was the case in Massachusetts Bay.

A detailed overview of cases heard in Maine courts is beyond the scope of this paper, but we will provide two examples that help illustrate governance in Maine. Courts in Maine were successful in resolving some disputes, showing their effectiveness in governance along some margins. But these courts also lacked the power to enforce a stable set of rules. One of the earliest court records comes from the town of Saco in 1640. Consider the land dispute between settlers, George Cleeve and John Winter, resolved by this court. In this case, Cleeve accuses Winter of possessing two thousand acres of land that are rightfully Cleeve's. (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 58-59). Cleeve argues that Sir Ferdinando Gorges (then proprietor of the Province of Maine) had promised him the land in Winter's possession. Winter's defense was that Cleeve had no legal basis to possess the land based on a dubious promise and that Winter's principal, Robert Trelawney, did have a legal claim to the land, explaining Winter's possession of it (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 59-60). Ultimately, this dispute was resolved through a jury trial. Cleeve was awarded a small portion of the disputed land along with a house already constructed on that land and £80 for damages (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 61-2). Despite this ruling by the court, however, Winter refused to comply and was later arrested when he failed to vacate the land (Reid, 1981, pp. 107-12). The dispute between Cleeve and Winter carried on but this case highlights two aspects of governance in the Province of Maine.

First, the lack of a strong state meant some disputes went unresolved as there were no effective means by which rulings could be enforced if met with enough resistance. But this failure did not imply that violence among settlers was the alternative solution. Borrowing governance institutions from England, just as other English settlers such as those in Massachusetts did, settlers in Maine avoided devolving into the lawlessness that many early historians presumed was the case (Churchill, 1978; Reid, 1981). Second, the establishment of property rights over land was clearly an important function of governance. This created a situation in which settlers would develop a strong interest in the protection of their property in the pursuit of profit.

The second example we consider relates to several courts held under the authority of the royal commission sent by the King of England to establish a government in Maine during the 1660s. At this point, the Massachusetts Bay Colony began its attempts to annex Maine. Sir Ferdinando Gorges' grandson, Ferdinando Gorges, took issue with the Massachusetts claim and sought to assert his claim under a Royal Commission (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 202-8). Gorges' attempts to set up a new government in Maine might at first appear to move Maine toward a more centralized colonial government. However, the courts held under the authority of the royal commission continued to exhibit the same structure as previous courts. That is, frequent courts were held across towns in Maine to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes and issue orders (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 211-338). Regardless of the change and new assertion of political authority, governance in Maine remained decentralized. It was not until the annexation of Maine by the Massachusetts Bay Colony was complete the late 1650s and early 1670s that a more centralized authority-controlled Maine (MacDonald, 1902; Chandler, 2017).

After annexation, Maine did not instantaneously become fully governed by Massachusetts. The institutional transition would of course take time. However, one of the main changes of interest for this paper is related to military control. With Maine under the authority of Massachusetts by the 1670s, military leaders in Massachusetts began to take an interest in the defense of Maine towns. The significance of this change is that decisions regarding conflict and defense of towns in Maine moved from the inhabitants of those towns to leaders of the militias. This implies that decision-making power became more concentrated in the hands of people who did not bear the full costs of their decisions regarding conflict. Indeed, the militia leaders could solidify their roles if violence occurred. For them, the benefit of war was increasing. The effects of these changes will be discussed in more detail in the section that follows.

## 4. Relations between the English settlers in Maine and the Natives during the 17th century

We divide the seventeenth century into two distinct periods. From 1622 to the late 1650s is the 'stateless period' when Maine was not under the jurisdiction of the Crown or a central colonial government. The latter period, 'annexation,' lasted from the late 1650s to the end of the century. The stateless period was marked by decentralized governance, while in the annexation period the Massachusetts Bay Colony gradually centralized authority and defense.

This division clarifies the transition in institutions that occurred in Maine which we argue created the conditions for prolonged conflict. Prior to annexation, English settlers and Natives in Maine managed to resolve conflict with minimal violence. After annexation, a series of wars broke out (see Table 2) that would continue until the American Revolutionary War and lead to the destruction of most towns in Maine.

**Table 2: The English and Abenaki at War**

| War | Year |
|---|---|
| King Philip's War | 1675-78 |
| King William's War | 1688-99 |
| Queen Anne's War | 1702-13 |
| Drummer's War | 1721-25 |
| King George's War | 1745-48 |
| French and Indian War | 1755-59 |
| American Revolution | 1775-82 |

### 4.1 The stateless period

Prior to any permanent settlements in Maine, Englishmen had explored the coast for fishing purposes. On one of these voyages, led by Captain George Weymouth in 1605, Englishmen traded furs with Natives (Varney, 1873). Relations were quickly soured when Captain Weymouth captured five Native men and brought them back to England (Varney, 1873; Swett, 1899; Sewall, 1859). Captain Weymouth's actions contributed to the underlying hostility among the Natives in Maine that made early attempts at permanent settlement difficult. Early attempts at English settlement in Maine occurred during the first decade of the 17th century (just a couple of years after Captain Weymouth's voyage) under the leadership of George Popham (Abbott and Elwell, 1892). However, these efforts were quickly abandoned as the English ran out of supplies and faced threats from Natives (Sewall, 1859). After Popham's colony was abandoned, many Englishmen made annual journeys to the Maine coast for fishing and began trading with the Natives (Varney, 1873). These early trade relations helped repair relations after Captain Weymouth's capture of Native men and laid the groundwork for peaceful relations during the period of permanent settlement.

During the stateless period, the region was under the authority of a land grant to two Englishmen, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason (Reid, 1981). Though this land grant contained provisions for the establishment of a colonial government as was the case for other colonies such as Massachusetts, little was done in the way of organizing a formal colonial government within the territory (Burrage, 1914). Within a decade, the original land grant to Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason was reorganized as parcels were sold off to various individuals and the settlements continued to grow (Varney, 1873). Captain John Mason took the portion of the grant that would later become New Hampshire. Sir Ferdinando Gorges controlled Maine and granted a portion of his land to the trader Walter Bagnall, who established a trading post along the Pemaquid river (Burrage, 1914, pp. 197-198, 214). The early English settlers used the proprietors' trading posts to fish and export their catch back to England (Churchill, 1978). The fishing stations established in Maine eventually lead to the formation of permanent settlements by the late 1620s, but "in western Maine the first [permanent plantations], York, Saco, and possible Cape Porpoise, were founded in 1630" (Churchill, 1978, p. 30). By 1630 there were more than 84 families and many fishermen living in the settlements along the coast of Maine (Abbott and Elwell, 1892, p. 89). Over the course of the 1630s, several additional permanent settlements were established.

Despite the establishment of what was supposed to be a unified colony, the breaking up of the land grant and the absence of Sir Ferdinando Gorges made it difficult to establish a colonial government (Reid, 1981, p. 56). Instead, governance primarily occurred at the town level where there was little distinction between settler and government actors. Courts, as described above, were held frequently to deal with disputes that arose. The English were at a military disadvantage due to a small population relative to surrounding Native groups. (Baker, 2004). This demographic imbalance was compounded when the second generation of settlers began to take over circa 1650. The handful of early settlers that purchased virtually all the land from the Kennebec to Pemaquid had primarily female heirs. Key players included Robert Gutch (seven daughters and one son), Thomas Atkin (10 daughters), and Alexander Thwaites (five daughters and one son) (Baker, 1987, p. 89). This demographic disparity left the English with minimal ability to fight as women were not expected to participate in war.

As discussed in Section 3, courts held throughout Maine served as a venue for resolving disputes among settlers but also lacked the power to enforce binding orders across the region. It appears that the lack of power extended to controlling an organized militia in Maine. Like other colonies, men in Maine engaged in regular training for militia service (Leach, 1973, p. 14). But without a central body governing military decisions, militias in Maine amounted to groups of individual settlers whose interests were in protecting their settlements rather than being a force that could be mobilized throughout the colony. Relations, then, between English settlers and the Natives in Maine were governed by individual interactions built around the trade of goods and land. In this context, disputes that did arise were specific to interacting parties and did not become broader issues between English and Natives as entire groups.

The Natives living around the Kennebec River, close to the English settlements in Maine, and the English established a court where complaints between the two groups could be heard "by the sagamores, if the Natives were in fault, and by the court, if the settlers were in the wrong" (Sewall, 1859, p. 133). To our knowledge, there are no records of these courts in how they set out to resolve disputes between Natives and English settlers. Outside the courts described by Sewall, there are examples in the historical record that illustrate dispute resolution between Natives and English settlers on a more localized level. However, this should not be taken to imply that conflict never arose. What we observe instead, is something like Boulding's (1978) "unstable peace."

From the earliest days of settlement, there were sporadic violent conflicts between the English and the Natives (Reid, 1981). During this stateless period, those conflicts never escalated to prolonged warfare. In most of the recorded cases of conflict, the Natives and colonists were able to meet and come to a resolution or otherwise avoid further violence. For instance, many Natives were captured by Englishmen and sold into slavery in the West Indies (Ellis and Morris, 1906). However, strong trade relations incentivized the English and Natives to avoid any prolonged conflict as the risk of losing future trade opportunities and loss of life loomed large in these disputes.

One of the more well documented examples of this sort of violence that occurred during the period is the killing of Walter Bagnall in 1631. Walter Bagnall was an English trader who earned a reputation for cheating the Natives in trade (Reid, 1981, p. 67). One day in the fall of 1631, several Natives including "Scitterygusset, an Indian chief, and some of his tribe, killed Bagnall and a man associated with him, plundered his house and then burned it" (Burrage, 1914, pp. 199-200). Following the killing, Walter Neal, and a group of other Englishmen, sought out Bagnall's killers, captured them, and then executed the group by hanging (Abbott and Elwell, 1892, p. 98). The back and forth of violent attacks between the Natives and English certainly threatened the peace going forward. However, neither Natives nor English settlers would have found it in their interest to pursue conflict further. If violence were to continue between the two groups, both would face considerable risks in terms of loss of life and property with little to gain individually. The point here, especially on the side of the English, is that there was no standing army at the command of military leaders who would be making the decisions about pursuing conflict further. Decision makers were the ones who would bear the costs of conflict. Furthermore, even if the Natives held the military advantage, they risked losing continued trade opportunities if conflict continued. Subsequent retaliation stopped before any further destruction could occur, and relations quickly resumed to peace.

The repeated dealings between the English settlers and Natives served to discipline both parties. Even the instances of conflict can be seen as enforcing the implicit rules of trade the two groups had agreed to. The Natives' decision to kill Walter Bagnall would have sent a message to other English settlers that cheating the Natives would not go unpunished. In this way, the continuation of peaceful trade relations could continue as both sides faced costs of cheating their trading partners.

One of the concerns some of the English settlers had with respect to trade relations with the Natives was related to the issue of firearms. Through their trade in furs, the Natives were able to acquire a wide variety of English goods including firearms and ammunition (Richter, 2013). Some of the English viewed this as a threat to their survival as the Natives could use the weaponry to attack newly settled towns more effectively. Although this fear is not entirely illogical, there is good reason to believe that trade in firearms also was an indirect mechanism through which peace could be preserved.

The Natives were deeply involved in the fur trade with the English around Maine. Outside of trade, the Natives would hunt game for meat and fur for clothing (Bourque, 1989). With the arrival of the English, the Natives had an additional use for the fur acquired from hunting in that it could be traded for other English goods such as cookware, alcohol, and tools (Morrison, 1991). This incentivized the Natives to increase their production of furs. Demsetz (1974) uses the example of the Montagnes who lived around present-day Quebec to illustrate how increasing demand for furs encouraged the development of property rights. Firearms likely played an important role in the emergence and enforcement of property rights for Natives, including those around Maine. With a stronger interest in hunting lands being exclusive to one group, Natives could use firearms to defend their property rights from trespassers. In doing so, the Natives would avoid the downsides of over exploitation in commonly held hunting land.

Native access to firearms then not only made it so that the Natives could be more effective in conflict but also more effective in trade. So long as the benefits from trade were increasing, there would be weak incentives for conflict. Entering conflict with the English, even under conditions of sure success, would not create much in terms of gain for the Natives. They were better off continuing to trade, enabled in part by the new tools they had acquired. This is especially the case given the limited pressures on conflict over land use at the time.

Both Natives and English on the Maine coast and surrounding inland areas were small enough in population that disputes over land were unlikely. Any pressures for conflict over land could easily be resolved through voluntary arrangements between the two groups. Some of the earliest land grants from Native to Englishmen occurred during this period (Baker, 1989). In fact, "the overwhelming majority of Native land transactions [in Maine] occurred before [King Philip's War in 1675]" (Baker, 2004, p. 92). Although the legitimacy of these transactions has been disputed in the historical literature, what matters for our purposes is that the prevailing conditions for peace resulted in cooperation. Those decisions to transfer land preserved peace in the early years even if in later decades they served as one of the reasons for dispute and resulting conflict.

Furthermore, trade in land and furs between Natives and the English in Maine were deeply interconnected. Baker (2004, p. 2) describes some groups of Natives such as the Almouchiquois in southern Maine as "engaged in intensive interaction" with English traders and settlers. Related to this point on trade relations and land transactions, Baker (2004, p. 77) writes:

> The Englishmen involved [in land transactions with Natives] were usually also the fur traders who dealt with the Native Americans on a regular basis. They kept individual accounts with them and knew their whereabouts, particularly when it related to gathering furs. The traders were familiar enough with them to know who the Native leaders were, and they probably also had some understanding of their authority--hence the common practice of identifying multiple Indians as grantors, as well as calling on Indian witnesses and deponents. Englishmen wanted to have good title to the land they acquired and to assure that they had Indian cooperation and permission to occupy a property. If lands were not purchased from the proper tribal authorities, the Wabanaki might retaliate.

This passage captures the incentive dynamics that Natives and English settlers faced at the time. The English were settling in an area remote from other English settlements, the closest being in Massachusetts and had to rely on those around them to establish a stable life. Any actions that would threaten peaceful relations with the Natives such as the Almouchiquois were a direct threat to their livelihood. That meant that Natives and English had to find ways to live together despite any underlying tensions between the two groups.

Tensions and potential hostilities were certainly apparent at this time. For instance, in 1636, Natives attacked a small settlement on Richmond's Island killing 30 pigs and in the previous year, Thomas Wise had some of his pigs killed by Natives in Saco (Reid, 1981, p. 67). In response at a court held in Saco, it was ordered that settlers had an obligation to kill or capture any Native found to kill livestock or destroy property of the English (Maine Historical Society, 1928, pp. 2-3; Reid, 1981, p. 68). However, there is no evidence that there were increasing rates of violence between the English and Natives after these events. Later, sometime in the 1650s, "'some thousands of Indians' at Piscataqua caused 'the great affright of the people in those parts' and resulted in the sending of an armed force from Massachusetts as a precaution" (Reid, 1981, p. 68). The standoff did not result in violence, but the involvement of armed forces in Massachusetts foreshadowed what was to come in Maine after annexation that ultimately contributed to war in the region.

### 4.2 Maine during and after annexation by the Massachusetts Bay Colony

Starting in the second half of the 17th century, Maine progressively moved away from self-governance as it was annexed by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In this section we detail the shift in governance and how it affected relations with the Natives. We make two main points. First, the shift in governance altered the calculus of conflict for the English as policy makers in the colonial government did not bear the full costs of their decisions when it came to regulating trade or responding to Native attacks. Second, with the costs of conflict much lower from a policy making perspective, war became more likely. It was during this period that small-scale conflict between English settlers and Natives turned into prolonged warfare.

Prior to annexation, Maine was tied to the Massachusetts Bay Colony through trade relations in Boston (Churchill, 1978; Reid, 1981). The timber and fishing industries were the most common sources of goods within Maine and were brought down to Boston for sale (Reid, 1981). These trade relations created a strong interest within the colonial government of Massachusetts to formally annex Maine. The advantages of such a change would be to have access to a new source of tax revenues, establishing more uniform regulations for trade, finance transportation infrastructure between the two territories, and more control over access to natural resources throughout Maine (Abbott and Elwell, 1892; Reid, 1981). In addition to the concrete benefits of annexation, the Massachusetts colonial government viewed the apparent lawlessness in Maine as justification for "taking over political control of all or part of the region (Churchill, 1978, p. 36).

Annexation began in 1652 with the first portion of Maine territory being renamed, the County of Yorkshire. Over the next several years, the Massachusetts Bay Colony continued to annex the territory of Maine. Though there was some resistance by English settlers throughout Maine, the process of annexation proceeded with little violence (Abbott and Elwell, 1892; Reid, 1981). The primary source of resistance came from Ferdinando Gorges, the grandson of the original proprietor of the province, who asserted his claim to the region under the original patent to which he was heir. As discussed above, Gorges' claim to Maine slowed the attempt of the colonial government in Massachusetts to control Maine.

By 1658, all the towns in Maine had submitted to annexation and the Massachusetts Bay Colony controlled all the territory, leaving the original patentees with no control over their land (Reid, 1981, p. 131). Quickly, the colonial government of Massachusetts began implementing trade regulations to address the lawlessness throughout the Maine territory. Just a year after the completion of annexation, "acts were passed relating thereto, for the restraint of lawlessness in trade, and regulating intercourse with the Native population" (Sewall, 1859: p. 133). However, the establishment of complete political authority in the region gradually occurred through the early 1670s. The introduction of new trade regulations certainly threatened the existing trade relations, but there is limited evidence for us to explore that would help analyze the extent trade was undermined. Instead, we focus on the military changes that occurred within Maine.

King Philip's War spread to Maine by September 1675 (Ellis and Morris, 1906). It should be noted that the "war waged along the coast of Maine, although contemporary with the outbreak in the southern colonies, was not directly part of that conflict" (Ellis and Morris, 1906, p. 293). The outbreak of this war in Maine did, however, represent the first violent conflict that can be considered war in the region. Historians have attributed the outbreak of the war to rising tensions between the English and Natives due to a few reasons. Reid (1981) cites "a food shortage caused by the Massachusetts authorities' efforts in 1674 to prevent the trading of powder and shot to the Abenaki" and then in the following year, an effort to "disarm completely the various branches of the Abenaki" (p. 167).

Additionally, several Englishmen tipped a Natives' canoe and drowned one of their children in 1675 (Morrison, 1991, p. 237). This latter incident though was not unique as there had been various violent encounters in earlier years throughout Maine that never led to all-out war. The question is then, what changed in Maine? Institutions shifted in Maine such that military leaders from Massachusetts held the power to decide where to send soldiers that contributed to prolonged warfare.

The evidence of the above argument is found in examining the unfolding of King Philip's War in Maine. First, we know that just before war broke out, some English settlers, such as Thomas Gardner, had maintained peaceful trade relations with the Abenaki (Reid, 1981, p. 70). But in September 1675, Natives first attacked the home of Thomas Purchase (Ellis and Morris, 1906, p. 294). In response to the attack, the Massachusetts General Court, "sent commissioners with full military powers, to Maine, who were directed to see that neither guns, powder, knives, nor lead, should be sold to any Indian who was not fully known to be friendly" (Abbott and Elwell, 1892, p. 175). That order was followed by another order to disarm any Natives (Abbott and Elwell, 1892, p. 175). The two orders from Massachusetts were among the first decisions that contributed to the transition to war.

The September attack was followed by retaliatory attacks by some Englishmen which "were quickly followed by attacks upon Exeter and Salmon Falls, and a little later houses were destroyed at Oyster River and two men killed. Small parties of Indians now prowled the woods in every direction, burning barns and houses, killing men and cattle" (Ellis and Morris, 1906, p. 295). We would expect the settlers in Maine, at this point, to try and avoid any further conflict. They faced considerable risk of losing entire towns and their lives if attacks continued. But the orders from Massachusetts allowed military leaders to decide when and where to send soldiers in defense of towns in Maine (Reid, 1981, p. 168). The first of these decisions was made by Captain Wincoll who sent a party of sixteen men to Winter Harbor (Ellis and Morris, 1906, p. 296).

The use of militia soldiers at the command of military leaders posed a problem for prolonging the conflict. Those military leaders did not bear the full costs of conflict and were more willing to engage in it as they saw fit. This is not to suggest that their intentions were wrong. They intended to help their fellow Englishmen by coming to their defense. However, these actions undermined the possibility of peace by providing Native groups additional reasons to retaliate. The first attempt at peace came in January of 1676, followed by the signing of a peace treaty between the English and Natives in July of that year (Ellis and Morris, 1906, pp. 299-300). The initial peace did not last.

Just two months later in September of 1676, "the authorities in Boston sent into the eastern country one hundred and thirty soldiers and forty Natick Indians, under Captains Sill, Hathorne and Hunting" (Ellis and Morris, 1906, p. 307). The additional movement of soldiers into Maine acted to exacerbate tensions between the English and Natives, undermining peace and lead to a continuation of the war. Here again, we have a clear illustration of how the calculus of conflict changed given the institutional shift in decision making power. For the settlers of Maine, their interests were in surviving and limiting any further damage to their towns. For the authorities in Boston, their interests were in protecting their authority over the now annexed region of Maine and to do so required military force. The risk of losing soldiers (settlers) was a cost those authorities viewed as worth paying to maintain their political control over the land.

As these sorts of actions continued, so did the war in Maine. It was not until 1678 that peace was settled in Maine. By that time, Maine had been devastated with several towns having been destroyed and many settlers losing their lives (Ellis and Morris, 1906; Abbott and Elwell, 1892). Reid (1981) goes as far as to argue that King Philip's War in Maine "virtually wiped out any semblance of a stable colonial society in Maine" (p. 69). The military intervention of Massachusetts in Maine marked the end of the unstable peace and transition to unstable war. Decisions over conflict were out of the control of those bearing the costs of violence resulting in a new era of unstable war.

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that early settlement in Maine provides an illustrative case study of the relationship between institutions and intergroup conflict. The transition from self-governance to colonial government in Maine shifted the conflict calculus enough to make prolonged violent conflict more likely. It is not that the colonial government of the Massachusetts Bay colony represents a strong centralized government we might imagine in the sense of states today. However, the colonial government was certainly a move toward more centralized decision-making relative to the earlier conditions of self-governance. Specifically, military decisions were now made in Boston, rather than by the Maine colonists. In this way, a disconnect was created between decision-making about violent conflict and the costs of that conflict. The ties between settlers, who bore the costs of conflict, and military leaders or other colonial authorities, who then held decision-making power were severed. Those military leaders then made decisions that undermined the conditions for peace and ultimately led to the transition from unstable peace to unstable war.

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